Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

Research Report No. 31/2007

Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes: Baby Steps Taken in Canada Trustco,
Mathew, Placer Dome and Imperial Oil
Jinyan Li
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, JLi@osgoode.yorku.ca

David M. Piccolo

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe
Recommended Citation
Li, Jinyan and Piccolo, David M., "Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Baby Steps Taken in Canada
Trustco, Mathew, Placer Dome and Imperial Oil" (2007). Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy. Research Paper No. 31/
2007.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/247

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER 31/2007
Jinyan Li and David Piccolo

Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes:
Baby Steps Taken in Canada Trustco, Mathew, Placer Dome and
Imperial Oil
EDITORS: Peer Zumbansen (Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Director, Comparative Research in
Law and Political Economy, York University), John W. Cioffi (University of California at Riverside),
Lindsay Krauss (Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Production Editor)

CLPE Research Paper 31/2007
Vol. 03 No. 06 (2007)
Jinyan Li and David Piccolo

REVIVING THE MODERN RULE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
TAX STATUTES: BABY STEPS TAKEN IN CANADA TRUSTCO,
MATHEW, PLACER DOME AND IMPERIAL OIL
Abstract: Canada Trustco, Mathew, Placer Dome and Imperial Oil are
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in terms of their
illumination on the principle of statutory interpretation. In these cases, the
Court stated that the Income Tax Act should be interpreted in accordance
with a “textual, contextual and purposive” approach. This amounts to a
revival of the “modern rule” of statutory interpretation and a move away
from the “plain meaning” approach previously adopted by the Court. This
article argues that the steps taken by the Court in reviving the modern rule
are merely baby steps, as many key questions remain inadequately
addressed. The article first discusses the rise and fall of the modern rule in
Canadian tax jurisprudence. It then analyzes each of the four decisions
and highlights the contribution of each case to the development of the
textual, contextual and purposive interpretation. The article concludes
with some thoughts on the challenges facing the courts in establishing the
“purpose” of provisions of the Act and offers some suggestions for
moving forward.
Keywords: Canada Trustco, Mathew, Placer Dome, Imperial Oil, Income
Tax Act, Canada, modern rule, statutory interpretation
JEL classification: K10, K34
Forthcoming in: Supreme Court Law Review
Author Contacts:
Jinyan Li
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto ON
Email: jinyanli@osgoode.yorku.ca

i

David Piccolo
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto ON
Email: davidpiccolo@osgoode.yorku.ca

ii

REVIVING
THE
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IN
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INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES: BABY STEPS
TAKEN IN CANADA TRUSTCO, MATHEW, PLACER
DOME AND IMPERIAL OIL
Jinyan Li and David Piccolo*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada made two landmark tax decisions:
Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada1 and Mathew v. Canada.2 For
the first time, the Court ruled on the application of the general antiavoidance rule (GAAR) and articulated a uniform approach to statutory
interpretation on the basis of the “modern rule” – the “textual, contextual
and purposive” (TCP) approach. The far-reaching implications of these
decisions in GAAR jurisprudence have been well discussed elsewhere.3
*

Jinyan Li is a Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, email:
jinyanli@osgoode.yorku.ca; David Piccolo is an LL.B. Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law
School, email davidpiccolo@osgoode.yorku.ca
1

2005 SCC 54 [Canada Trustco].

2

2005 SCC 55 [Mathew]. This case and Canada Trustco, ibid., were heard together.

3

See Benjamin Alarie, Sanjana Bhatia & David G. Duff, “Symposium on Tax Avoidance
After Canada Trustco and Mathew: Summary of Proceedings” (2005) 53 Can. Tax. J.
1010; Brian Arnold, “Confusion Worse Confounded – The Supreme Court’s GAAR
Decisions” (2006) 54 Can. Tax. J. 167 (hereinafter “Arnold, “Confusion Worse
Confounded”); --, “The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance
Rule” (2004) 52 Can. Tax. J. 488; --, “Reflections on the Relationship between Statutory
Interpretation and Tax Avoidance” (2001) 49 Can. Tax. J. 1; Patrick J. Boyle, William I.
Innes & Joel Nitikman, The Essential GAAR Manual: Policies, Principles and
Procedures (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 2006); David G. Duff & Harry Erlichman, eds.,
Tax Avoidance in Canada after Canada Trustco and Mathew, (Toronto: Irvin Law,
2007); Malcolm Gammie, “Barclays and Canada Trustco: Further Comment from a UK
Perspective” (2005) 53 Can. Tax. J. 1047; Thomas E. McDonnell, “Restrictive View of
Avoidance Transaction and Abusive Avoidance: Evans v. The Queen” (2006) Can. Tax.
J. 461; Alan M. Schwartz, ed., GAAR interpreted: the general anti-avoidance rule
(Toronto: Carswell, 2006).

2
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This article focuses on the importance of these decisions in statutory
interpretation. Although it was unclear whether the TCP approach was
limited to the GAAR, these two decisions represented a shift away from
the literal or plain meaning approach towards a revival of the modern rule
in the interpretation of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).4
By coincidence, the Court had two more opportunities to revisit the issue
of statutory interpretation in 2006. Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario
(Minister of Finance) 5 made it clear that the TCP approach applies to tax
statutes in general, including provincial tax statutes. In Imperial Oil Ltd. v.
Canada,6 the Court further confirmed the application of the TCP
approach, even when it was split on its application to the facts of the case.
This article critically assesses these four decisions in terms of their stance
on statutory interpretation. Following this introduction, Part II provides a
background for the shift and briefly overviews the rise and fall of the
modern rule in Canadian tax jurisprudence. Part III discusses Canada
Trustco and Mathew and the Court’s thinking on the importance of the
TCP approach and the guidelines on its application. Part IV reviews
Placer Dome and examines the extent to which it advances the Court’s
thinking on purposive interpretation. Part V reviews Imperial Oil and
highlights the major differences between the majority and the dissenting
justices on the relevance and proof of legislative purpose or intent. Part VI
argues that the revival of the modern rule in the form of the TCP approach
is encouraging, even though the steps taken thus far merely represent
“baby steps”. There are strong signals that the Court will adhere to this
approach. The article concludes with some thoughts on the challenges
facing the courts in establishing the “purpose” of provisions of the Act and
offers some suggestions for moving forward.

4

R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1.

5

2006 SCC 20 [Placer Dome].

6

2006 SCC 46 [Imperial Oil].
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “MODERN
RULE”
A. THE MODERN RULE
The “modern rule” of statutory interpretation calls for “the words of an
Act to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and
the intention of parliament.”7 This requires an examination of the
meaning of the words used in the statute, the context of the provision
within the statute, the scheme and object of the statute, and the legislative
intent. It was adopted by the Supreme Court in Stubart Investments Ltd. v.
Canada.8 This meant that tax statutes would be interpreted in the same
manner as other statutes.9
The modern rule was further entrenched when section 12 of the
Interpretation Act10 was enacted. It states that “every enactment is
deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its
objects.”

7

Elmer A. Dreidger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at
87.
8

[1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, [1984] C.T.C. 294, 84 D.T.C. 6305 [Stubart]. This case is known
for its adoption of the modern rule of statutory interpretation as well as its rejection of the
“business purpose” test as an anti-avoidance rule. In response to the second element,
Parliament enacted a statutory anti-avoidance rule or GAAR in section 245 of the Act.
9

As discussed further, however, the Income Tax Act is still considered to be “different”
from other statutes because of the inherent complexity and high level of technicality.

10

R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21.
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B. THE RISE
Traditionally, Canadian courts interpreted tax statutes strictly. This
approach is perhaps best articulated in a dictum of the House of Lords in
Partington v. A.G. (1869):11
… as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the
person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must
be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind
to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax,
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is
free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might
otherwise appear to be.
Under the strict approach, if the language of the statute is not literally apt
to catch the transaction at issue, then it is not subject to the statute. In
other words, where there is doubt or ambiguity in the provisions that levy
a tax, the ambiguity is interpreted in favour of the taxpayer. This
interpretative approach was instrumental to the success of tax planning.
The rationale for strict interpretation has often been related to “notions of
personal liberty”12 and the confiscation of property.13
Canadian courts started to move away from the strict approach in the late
1970s.14 The rise of the modern rule gained momentum with Stubart. In
11

L.R. 4 H.L. 100 (H.L.), 122, per Lord Cairns.

12

Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications, 2001) at 194.

13

Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978) at 170-71.

14

For a general discussion of statutory interpretation, see Brian Arnold, “The Supreme
Court and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes – Again” (2006) 54 Can. Tax. J. 677; -“Confusion Worse Confounded”), supra note 3; -- “Statutory Interpretation: Some
Thoughts on Plain Meaning”, Report of Proceedings of Fiftieth Tax Conference, 1998
Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) 6:1-36; David G. Duff,
“Justice Iacobucci and the ‘Golden and Straight Metwand’ of Canadian Tax Law” (2007)
57 U.T.L.J. 525; --, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 1: Interpretive Doctrines”
(1999) 47 Can. Tax. J. 464; --, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 2: Toward a
Pragmatic Approach” (1999) 47 Can. Tax. J. 741; David G. Duff et. al., Canadian
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Stubart, the Court gave two justifications for the development. First, the
nature of the income tax laws had changed: “Income tax legislation, such
as the federal Act in our country, is no longer a simple device to raise
revenue to meet the cost of governing the community. Income taxation is
also employed by government to attain selected economic policy
objectives.”15 Second, the modern rule is helpful to “reduce the attraction
of elaborate and intricate tax avoidance plans.”16 Purposive interpretation
was thus considered a tool to prevent tax avoidance.17
Subsequent to the Stubart decision, the Court broke further away from the
traditional strict approach. For example, in Bronfman Trust v. The
Queen18, the Court disallowed the taxpayer’s interest deduction because it
was not used to earn income from business or property. The Court
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the borrowed funds allowed the trust
to indirectly earn income because to do so would open the availability of
the deduction to a broader use than what was intended by Parliament. The
Chief Justice stated:19
Parliament created subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i), and made it operate
notwithstanding paragraph 18(1)(b), in order to encourage the
accumulation of capital which would produce taxable income. Not
all borrowing expenses are deductible.

income tax law, 2nd ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 2006); Tim Edgar and Daniel Sandler,
eds., Materials on Canadian Income Tax, 13th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005); Peter
Hogg, Joanne Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 5th ed.
(Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2005), c. 19; Vern Krishna, The Fundamentals of
Canadian income tax, 8th ed. (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2004); Joel Nitikman and
Derek Alty, “Some Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation in Canadian Tax Law – A Reply
to Brian Arnold” (2000) 20 Tax Notes International 2185.
15

Stubart, supra note 7 at 6322.

16

Ibid., at 6322.

17

Ibid., at 6322.

18

[1987] 1 C.T.C. 117, 87 D.T.C. 5059 (S.C.C.).

19

Ibid., at para. 28.
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C. THE FALL
In the early 1990s, the Court’s stance on statutory interpretation changed.
The modern rule continued to be cited, but its impact was reduced
significantly by the rise of the “plain meaning” approach. One of the first
cases to cause the fall of the modern rule is Antosko v. The Queen.20 The
taxpayer purchased $5 million in debt from a provincial agency for $10
and the promise to run a failing company for two years. Interest income
had accrued while the debt was in the provincial agency’s hands, and
when it became payable, the taxpayer deducted the amount that had
accrued in the agency’s hands under subsection 20(14) of the Act. The
deduction was authorized by the literal language of the Act, which
provided that, on the transfer of a debt obligation, any unpaid interest
accrued to the date of the transfer is to be included in the transferor’s
income and deducted from the transferee’s income. The transferor, being
an agency of the provincial government, was exempt from tax so that it
did not report or pay tax on the interest accrued up to the date of transfer.
The Minister took the position that it was contrary to the object and spirit
of the Act to allow the transferee taxpayer to deduct the accrued interest
when the transferor was not taxable – essentially, the subsection designed
to prevent double taxation was being used to create double non-taxation.
The Court rejected the Minister’s argument and allowed the deduction.
Iacobucci J., writing for the Court, held that the taxpayer was entitled to
rely upon the terms of the statute, which clearly entitled the transferee of a
debt obligation to a deduction for the interest accrued to the date of
transfer. Where the words of the statute were “clear and plain”, and where
the legal and practical effect of the taxpayer’s transaction brought the
taxpayer within the words of the statute, then the statute had to be applied
according to its terms regardless of the object and purpose of the
provision.21
The Court’s decision in Friesen v. R22 moved further away from the
modern rule. The issue in this case was whether the taxpayer’s land was
20

[1994] 2 C.T.C. 25, 94 D.T.C. 6314 (S.C.C.).

21

Ibid., at para. 25.

22

[1995] 2 C.T.C. 369, 95 D.T.C. 5551 (S.C.C.) [Friesen].
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inventory for the purpose of subsection 10(1) of the Act – if the land was
inventory, the taxpayer would be able to deduct the unrealized loss on the
property. The majority of the Court found that the land was inventory in
subsection 248(1), and made it clear that the modern rule was falling out
of favour:
In interpreting sections of the Income Tax Act, the correct approach,
as set out by Estey J. in Stubary Investments Ltd. v. The Queen,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, is to apply the plain meaning rule.23
[T]he object and purpose of a provision need only be resorted to
when the statutory language admits of some doubt or ambiguity.24
The above statements indicate that the Court, in Friesen misinterpreted the
modern rule as adopted in Stubart to be the same as the plain meaning
rule. That may explain why in subsequent cases25 the Court cited Stubart
for establishing the modern rule as the proper approach of statutory
interpretation, but paid lip service to it by giving a more literal
interpretation of the statutory provisions and ignoring the “scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.” The Court
dissected the modern rule into two parts. Find the plain meaning of the
statutory text first. Only if that exercise fails in establishing an
unambiguous interpretation may the court examine the “object or purpose”
of the statutory provision. The Court rationalized its approach on the
following ground:
It would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income Tax Act if
clear language in a detailed provision of the Act were to be qualified
by unexpressed exceptions derived from a court’s view of the object
and purpose of the provision …26
23

Ibid., at para. 10.

24

Ibid., at para. 60.

25

See e.g. Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, [2002] 1 C.T.C. 95, 2001 D.T.C. 5505
(S.C.C.).

26

See e.g. Friesen, supra note 22 at para. 11. This quote originated from Peter Hogg’s
lecture notes, which were incorporated into Hogg and Magee, Principles of Canadian
Income Tax Law, 1st ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 453-54.

8
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III. CANADA TRUSTCO AND MATHEW:
REVIVING THE MODERN RULE IN THE GAAR
CONTEXT
A. GAAR REQUIRES A PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
As mentioned already, Canada Trustco and Mathew were the first GAAR
cases heard by the Supreme Court. Parliament enacted the GAAR (section
245 of the Act) to prevent abusive tax avoidance transactions without
interfering with legitimate tax planning. Subsection 245(4) draws the line
between legitimate and abusive tax avoidance by stating that GAAR does
not apply to an avoidance transaction “where its may reasonably be
considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a
misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the
provisions of this Act, other than this section, read as a whole.” What
constitutes a “misuse” of the provisions of the Act or “abuse” of the
provisions of the Act read as a whole? Obviously, the answer to these
questions cannot be found by merely looking at the plain meaning of the
provisions relied upon, or avoided by, the taxpayer in achieving tax
avoidance. If the taxpayer cannot rely on the plain meaning of the specific
statutory provisions (including some specific anti-avoidance provisions),
the Minister would not have to use “the ultimate weapon”27 to deny the tax
benefit resulting from the avoidance transactions. In order to give
meaning to section 245, the court must look for something beyond the
plain meaning of a statutory provision. As such, the court must look at the
purpose of the provision and the intent of Parliament in enacting it. In
other words, the modern rule is needed to interpret the GAAR.28

27
28

Hill v. Canada (2002), [2003] 4 C.T.C. 2548, 2002 D.T.C. 1749 (T.C.C.) at para. 63.

In this sense, the GAAR could be viewed as a statutory interpreting rule to codify the
modern rule.
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Not surprisingly, the key issue in Canada Trustco and Mathew was the
interpretation of subsection 245(4), that is, whether the transactions
undertaken primarily for tax purposes were “abusive”.29 According to the
Court, the doctrine of “abuse” refers to the abuse of the “object, spirit and
purpose” of the legislation. The process of determining “abuse” under
subsection 245(4) involves two steps: first, interpret the provisions giving
rise to the tax benefit to determine their object, spirit and purpose; second,
determine whether the transaction falls within or frustrates that purpose.30

B. CANADA TRUSTCO
1. THE CASE
Canada Trustco had a significant amount of income from a portfolio of
loans and leases. In order to minimize its tax liability, the taxpayer looked
for tax structures that could shelter such income from tax. The structure
under appeal in this case involved a series of transactions that were, in
essence, a purchase and lease-back transaction. The goal was to generate
“tax deductions” in excess of income so that the deduction could be used
to shelter investment income.
Canada Trustco purchased trailers from a third party and concurrently subleased them back to the vendor. On the same day, further back-to-back
transactions were undertaken to ensure that the financial risk for all parties
was eliminated. As a result of these transactions, the positions of the
parties involved were essentially unchanged with one major exception:
technically, Canada Trustco had purchased the trailers (which are
depreciable property and eligible for capital cost allowance deductions)
and leased them back to the original “seller”. Because the deductions
exceeded the “lease income” during the first few years of the “lease”, the
deductions effectively reduced income from the existing portfolio of loans
29

The Court collapsed the “misuse” and “abuse” elements into a single “abuse” test:
Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 43. For more comments on this aspect of the
decisions, see Arnold (2006), supra note 3 at 187-89.

30

Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 44.
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and leases. Mission accomplished!? The CCA deductions were allowed
by the language of paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Act and related Income Tax
Regulations. The Minister challenged the structure under the GAAR,
alleging abuse of the “object, spirit and purpose” of these provisions.
The taxpayer prevailed at the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court
of Appeal. At the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and Major J. co-wrote
the decision for a unanimous court, upholding the lower court decisions.
2. INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES
With respect to statutory interpretation, the Court recognized the modern
rule as follows:31
It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that
"the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": see 65302
British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50.
The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to
a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is
harmonious with the Act as a whole.
The relative weight of the textual meaning, contextual meaning and
legislative purpose in the interpretive process may vary according to the
level of ambiguity of the provision:32
When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the
ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the
interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support
more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the
words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning,
context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all

31

Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 10.

32

Ibid.
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cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a
harmonious whole.
What separated the new TCP approach from the previous “plain meaning”
approach was the Court’s emphasis that “in all cases the court must seek to
read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole”. Under the plain
meaning approach, legislative purpose or intent was considered only in
cases where the meaning is not clear.
The Court again formally rejected traditional strict interpretation:33
As a result of the Duke of Westminster principle (Commissioners of
Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1 (H.L.)) that
taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs to minimize the amount
of tax payable, Canadian tax legislation received a strict
interpretation in an era of more literal statutory interpretation than the
present. There is no doubt today that all statutes, including the Act,
must be interpreted in a textual, contextual and purposive way.
However, the legacy of the Duke of Westminster remains under the TCP
approach: the particularity and detail of many tax provisions that often led
to an emphasis on textual interpretation;34 and the provisions of the Act
“must be interpreted in order to achieve consistency, predictability and
fairness so that taxpayers may manager their affairs intelligently.”35
Does the TCP apply to the interpretation of all provisions of the Act or
only those relevant to the application of the Act? The answer is unclear.
The Court seemed to endorse the traditional strict interpretation outside
the GAAR: “The Income Tax Act remains an instrument dominated by
explicit provisions dictating specific consequences, inviting a largely
textual interpretation.”36 To the extent that the GAAR applies, however,
33

Ibid., at para. 11.

34

Ibid. The Court repeated this in para. 13 that “The Income Tax Act remains an
instrument dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific consequences, inviting a
largely textual interpretation.”

35

Ibid., at para. 12.

36

Ibid., at para. 13.
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“the Duke of Westminster principle and the emphasis on textual
interpretation may be attenuated.”37
According to the Court, its role is “to interpret and apply the Act as it was
adopted by Parliament”.38 The Court acknowledged the tension between
the GAAR and other provisions of the Act relevant to a particular
transaction and appreciated the fact that it must, to the extent possible,
contemporaneously give effect to both the GAAR and these other
provisions.39 Had the Court viewed the TCP as a general interpretation
principle, applicable to the interpretation of every provision of the Act, it
might not have separated the statutory provisions into the two camps.
3. INTERPRETATION OF THE GAAR
Even if it was unclear whether the TCP applies to the Act generally, it
clearly applied in the GAAR context. The Court accepted that the purpose
of the GAAR is to deny the tax benefits of certain arrangements that
comply with a literal interpretation of the provisions of the Act, but
amount to an abuse of the provisions of the Act.40
As mentioned above, the abuse analysis under subsection 245(4) is a twostep process. The first step is to find the object, spirit and purpose of the
specific provision giving rise to the tax benefit; in Canada Trustco, it was
paragraph 20(1)(a), which allows a deduction for capital cost allowance.
The key term was “cost”. The key issue was whether “cost” had a literal
or broader meaning to reflect legislative purpose. The taxpayer argued for
the ordinary meaning – cost means the price that a taxpayer gave up in
order to acquire the asset.41 The Minister argued for a broader meaning –
the economic cost or the amount at risk. The Minister made the following
37

Ibid.

38

Shell Canada v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622 [Shell] at para. 45, cited in Canada
Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 13.

39

Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 13.

40

Ibid., at para. 16.

41

Ibid., at para. 71.
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submissions. The object and spirit of the CCA provisions are “to provide
for the recognition of money spent to acquire qualifying assets to the
extent that they are consumed in the income-earning process”.42 Since
Canada Trustco’s transaction involved no real risk, Canada Trustco did not
actually spend $120 million to purchase the trailers, and the “cost” of $120
million was an illusion. Therefore, the deduction of the illusive cost
contravened the object and spirit of the CCA provisions.43
The Court was persuaded by the taxpayer’s argument. “Textually, the
CCA provisions use "cost" in the well-established sense of the amount
paid to acquire the assets.”44 This textual meaning was supported by the
statutory context (i.e., other provisions of the Act). It was also consistent
with the purpose of the CCA provisions, which is “to permit deduction of
CCA based on the cost of the assets acquired.”45 How was the court
informed of such purpose? “This purpose emerges clearly from the
42

Ibid., at para. 70. The Minister relied on the reasons of Noël J.A. in Water's Edge
Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. Canada, [2003] 2 F.C. 25, 2002 FCA 291, at para. 44.

43

Ibid., at para. 70. The Minister’s main submission was summarized as follows:

In this case, the pre-ordained series of transactions misuses and abuses the CCA
regime because it manufactures a cost for CCA purposes that does not represent the
real economic cost to CTMC of the trailers. CTMC borrowed $97.4 million from
the Royal Bank, but ... the loan was effectively repaid in its entirety on the day it
was made. The assignment by CTMC to the Bank of MAIL's rent payments under
the lease continued the circular flow of money ... . There was no risk at all that the
rent payments would not be made. Even the $5.9 million that CTMC apparently
paid in fees was fully covered as it, along with the rest of CTMC's contribution of
$24.9 million in funding, will be reimbursed when the $19 million bond pledged to
CTMC matures in December 2005 at $33.5 million.

CTMC incurred no real economic cost, and thus was not entitled to any
"recognition for money spent to acquire qualifying assets"... . [Emphasis added]
44
45

Ibid., at para. 74.

Ibid. The Court essentially stated that the purpose of the provision is to allow a
deduction. However, this does not answer the question as to why the deduction should be
allowed in the first place. Also, the Court fails to recognize that the purpose of the CCA
provisions in general may be different than the purpose of the CCA provisions related to
sale-leaseback transactions.
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scheme of the CCA provisions within the Act as a whole.”46 Such purpose
would be distorted by interpreting “cost” to mean an economic cost or
sums of money at economic risk. The Court wrote:47
The applicable CCA provisions of the Act do not refer to economic
risk. They refer only to "cost". Where Parliament wanted to introduce
economic risk into the meaning of cost related to CCA provisions, it
did so expressly, as, for instance, in s. 13(7.1) and (7.2) of the Act,
which makes adjustments to the cost of depreciable property when a
taxpayer receives government assistance. "Cost" in the context of
CCA is a well-understood legal concept. It has been carefully defined
by the Act and the jurisprudence. Like the Tax Court judge, we see
nothing in the GAAR or the object of the CCA provisions that
permits us to rewrite them to interpret "cost" to mean "amount
economically at risk" in the applicable provisions. To do so would be
to invite inconsistent results. The result would vary with the degree of
risk in each case. This would offend the goal of the Act to provide
sufficient certainty and predictability to permit taxpayers to
intelligently order their affairs. For all these reasons, we agree with
the Tax Court judge's conclusion that the "cost" was $120 million,
not zero as argued by the appellant.
In the end, the Supreme Court agreed with the Tax Court that the CCA
deduction claimed by Canada Trustco was consistent with the object, spirit
and purpose of the CCA provisions and thus not abusive.

C. MATHEW
1. THE CASE
Standard Trust Company (STC) was a lender of money. In 1991, STC
became insolvent with $52 million in unrealized losses in a portfolio of
mortgages. Because of the insolvency, the losses were “useless” to STC
46

Ibid., at para. 74.
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as it had no taxable income. In an attempt to maximize the value of those
“assets”, a series of transactions was undertaken to enable the losses to be
deductible by another party. First, STC incorporated a wholly-owned
subsidiary and entered into a partnership agreement with it (Partnership
A). STC contributed its mortgages to Partnership A and then sold its
interest in the partnership to OSFC for $5 million. STC relied on
subsection 18(13) to transfer the portfolio of assets in Partnership A at
their historical cost. Partnership B was formed to acquire OSFC’s 99
percent interest in Partnership A. The taxpayers in this case became
partners of Partnership B. Partnership A liquidated its assets and realized
the $52 million in losses. Pursuant to subsection 96(1), the losses were
allocated to the partners. The taxpayers deducted their share of the losses
from their income and reduced their tax liability. The Minister denied the
deduction of the losses by relying on the GAAR. The taxpayers argued
that the language of subsections 18(13) and 96(1) permitted the
deductions.
Unlike Canada Trustco, the taxpayers in this case did not prevail at the
Tax Court of Canada or the Federal Court of Appeal. This case became
the “poster child” for GAAR-able transactions after the Supreme Court’s
decision. Like Canada Trustco, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. wrote the
decision for a unanimous court.
2. INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTIONS 18(13) AND 96(1)
The issue in this case was whether the transactions, that complied with the
textual meaning of subsections 18(13) and 96(1), violated the “object,
spirit and purpose” of these provisions.
Subsection 18(13) provides, in essence, that where a taxpayer whose
ordinary business includes the lending of money has sustained a loss on a
disposition of property used or held in that business, the loss cannot be
deducted by the taxpayer if the taxpayer (or a person or partnership that
does not deal at arm’s length with the taxpayer) owned the same or
identical property 30 days before or after the date of the disposition. The
amount of loss is added to the cost to the taxpayer of the substituted
property. In other words, subsection 18(13) is a “stop-loss” rule. In this
case, STC disposed of its portfolio of mortgages to Partnership A in return
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for interest in the partnership. The $52 million loss deduction for STC
that would normally occur on the disposition was denied, but was added to
the cost of the partnership interest.
Subsection 96(1) provides that income or loss of a partner in a partnership
is the partner’s share of the partnership’s income or loss. The taxpayers
relied on this provision to receive their share of the losses of Partnership
B, which, in turn, received its share of the losses of Partnership A.
The Court applied the textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of
these provisions. It noted that “[w]hile it is useful to consider the three
elements of statutory interpretation separately to ensure each has received
its due, they inevitably intertwine.”48
In this case, the Court did not provide a clear “textual” interpretation of
subsection 18(13) and 96(1). Frankly, the transfer of assets by STC to
Partnership A met the technical conditions set forth in subsection 18(13).
The allocation of losses to the partners was required by the wording of
subsection 96(1). The Court already stated in Canada Trustco: “[w]here
Parliament has specified precisely what conditions must be satisfied to
achieve a particular result, it is reasonable to assume that Parliament
intended that taxpayers would rely on such provisions to achieve the result
they prescribe.”49 Therefore, it appeared that when each provision was
interpreted separately, the textual meaning was fairly straightforward. The
court recognized this point:
On their face, the partnership provisions found in s. 96 of the Act
impose no restrictions on loss sharing between partners, except for
foreign partnerships under s. 96(8). Accumulated losses are available
to all partners, provided they entered the partnership before the end of
the taxation year. It is agreed that the appellants claimed losses in
proportion to their interests in Partnership B. Nevertheless, a question
arises as to whether these provisions can apply in conjunction with s.

48

Mathew, supra note 2 at para. 43.
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Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 11.
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18(13) to allow the appellants to claim losses that originated with the
original transferor, STC.50
The Court moved quickly to the contextual and purposive interpretation.
Indeed, there was a great deal of “intertwine” of the three elements. Even
under the heading of textual interpretation, the Court “intertwined” it with
purposive interpretation:51
The requirement that a partnership "not deal at arm's length with the
taxpayer" under s. 18(13) and the partnership rules must be
purposively construed in relation to each other and in the context of
other provisions of the Income Tax Act that address the transfer of
losses.
How did the legislative context help clarify the meaning or purpose of
subsection 18(13) and 96(1)? The Court first summarized the arguments
by the parties, decisions from lower courts, and then concluded that the
contextual interpretation was not conclusive52:
The government argues that other provisions of the Act show that the
transfer of losses to arm's length parties is generally against the
policy of the Act. It is allowed only exceptionally in specific
circumstances for specific purposes. The appellants counter that
where Parliament wished to prevent the transfer of losses to arm's
length parties, it did so explicitly, and that the absence of explicit
prohibitions in s. 18(13) and s. 96 permits the inference that
Parliament intended to allow such transfers.
The Federal Court of Appeal … properly concluded that the general
policy of the Income Tax Act is to prohibit the transfer of losses
between taxpayers, subject to specific exceptions. … This policy is
but one consideration to be taken into account in determining
Parliament's intent with respect to s. 18(13) and s. 96.

50

Mathew, supra note 2 at para. 45.
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Ibid., at para. 46.
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Ibid., at paras. 48-50.
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In summary, the legislative context surrounding s. 18(13) and s. 96 of
the Income Tax Act, while perhaps not in itself conclusive, suggests
that Parliament would not likely have intended arm's length parties to
be able to buy losses generated by s. 18(13) transfers.
The most significant aspect of the decision was the Court’s approach to
finding legislative purpose. First, the purpose was “implicitly” conveyed
by the statutory text.
Although, on its face, s. 96(1) imposes no restriction on the flow of
losses to its partners, except for the treatment of foreign partnerships
under s. 96(8), it is implicit that the rules are applied when partners in
a partnership carry on a business in common, in a non-arm's length
relationship.53
Second, the Court saw a broader purpose from the implicit purpose:54
The purpose for the broad treatment of loss sharing between partners
is to promote an organizational structure that allows partners to carry
on a business in common, in a non-arm's length relationship.
Third, the Court relied on the explicit wording of the provision:55
The purpose of s. 18(13) in particular is to prevent a taxpayer who is
in the business of lending money from claiming a loss upon the
superficial disposition of a mortgage or similar non-capital property.
…
Under s. 18(13), the loss is generally under the control of the
transferor or traceable to the business of the transferor and is
preserved because of its special relationship with the transferee
partnership. The section in effect denies the loss to the transferor
because it originated and remains in the transferor's control before
and after the transfer. To allow a new arm's length partner to buy into
53

Ibid., at para. 51.
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Ibid., at paras. 53-54.
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the transferee partnership and thus to benefit from the loss would
violate the fundamental premise underlying s. 18(13) that the loss is
preserved because it essentially remains in the transferor's control. It
would contradict the main purpose of s. 18(13) and the premise on
which it operates. Section 18(13) allows the preservation and transfer
of a loss because of the non-arm's length relationship between
transferor and transferee. Absent that relationship, there is no reason
for the provision to apply. [emphasis added]
The Court concluded that the combined purpose of subsections 18(13) and
96(1) is to disallow taxpayers from transferring losses to arm’s length
parties.56 Since the taxpayers and STC were arm’s length parties, the
deduction of STC’s losses by the taxpayers amounted to abusive tax
avoidance.57

D. REVIVING THE MODERN RULE
In Canada Trustco, the Court restated the modern rule of statutory
interpretation as the ‘textual, contextual and purposive’ approach, but
apparently only in the GAAR context. Among the three elements of the
interpretation process, textual interpretation remains the most basic. In
Canada Trustco, the ordinary meaning of “cost” was held to be consistent
with the context and purpose of the CCA provisions. In Mathew, textual
interpretation was closely intertwined, and indeed, superseded by
contextual and purposive interpretation.
On the basis of these two decisions, legislative context seems to include
other provisions of the Act as well as the “policy”, although the latter is
only one factor. No extrinsic materials were cited by the Court in either
case in establishing the legislative purpose of the specific provisions. The
Court relied on the text of the provisions, the legislative context
(especially the inclusion or absence of certain provisions that may indicate
56

Ibid., at para. 55. This lends support to Arnold’s argument that if the Act was
interpreted purposively, there would be no need for the GAAR. See Arnold, “Confusion
Worse Confounded”, supra note 3 at 181.
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Ibid., at para. 58.
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Parliament’s intent), as well as existing case law interpretation of specific
provisions. Extrinsic materials were referred to only in Canada Trustco in
determining the purpose of the GAAR.58
As this was the first time the Court outlined the textual, contextual and
purposive analysis, some questions emerge from the judgment. The first
question is the relative weight of each element. Although the Court stated
that the weight of the three elements will depend on the case, the Court
frequently stated that where the text of the provision is clear, the textual
interpretation will be emphasized. This raises the question as to what is a
clear provision in the Act? Clear to whom – a tax specialist, the average
lawyer, a layperson? The Court provided little guidance as to what a clear
provision in the Act entails in these two cases. Intuitively, the textual
meaning of subsections 18(13) and 96(1) are clear. But, the Court went
beyond the textual meaning and looked at the context to determine the
purpose of these provisions.
Another question is the extent to which the principle of certainty,
predictability and fairness overrides purposive interpretation.59 This
principle was the main justification for the plain meaning approach.60 If
the Court is more persuaded by the need for certainty and the taxpayer’s
right to legitimate tax minimization, the scope of purposive interpretation
is inevitably affected. For example, in Canada Trustco, because the term
“cost” in the context of CCA “is a well understood legal concept” which
“has been carefully defined by the Act and the jurisprudence”, replacing it
with “amount at economic risk” would invite inconsistencies because of
the varying degree at risk in each case. “This would offend the goal of the
Act to provide sufficient certainty and predictability to permit taxpayers to
intelligently order their affairs.”61
Finally, the most challenging aspect of the revived modern rule is finding
the “purpose” of statutory provisions. In Canada Trustco, to the Court,
legislative purpose “emerges clearly from the scheme of the CCA
58
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provisions within the Act as a whole.” To the government, such purpose
was obviously not clear; otherwise they were wasting taxpayer’s money
litigating the case. In Mathew, the legislative purpose did not “emerge
clearly” from the scheme of the Act and the Court relied on implicit text
and broader policy to support its finding of the legislative purpose.

IV. PLACER DOME – ADVANCING THE MODERN RULE
BEYOND GAAR
A. THE CASE
Placer Dome is engaged in the international exploration, production and
sale of gold. In 1995 and 1996, the taxpayer operated mines in Ontario
and was subject to Ontario’s Mining Tax Act.62 It realized over $17
million in profits from hedging transactions in those two years. The issue
in this case was whether hedging profits were taxable under the Mining
Tax Act. While the definition of “hedging” and related provisions
remained unchanged, the Minister’s administrative policy changed in
1998: until 1998, taxable “hedging” transactions excluded those that did
not result in the physical delivery from an Ontario mine; after 1998, the
physical delivery of products from an Ontario mine was no longer
required. Placer Dome’s tax liability in 1995 and 1996 was originally
assessed under the earlier administrative practice. The Minister reassessed
the taxpayer under the new practice and included the hedging profits in its
taxable income. The Minister argued that its new practice correctly
interpreted the statue.
Under the Mining Tax Act, mine operators pay tax based on their profit.
According to subsection 3(5), profits are calculated by subtracting
allowable deductions from “proceeds”. Subsection 1(1)63 contains the
following definition “proceeds” and “hedging”:
62
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“proceeds” means the total consideration that is received or is
receivable from another person or persons, in any currency, whether
in cash or non-cash form, from the output of the mine, … and all
consideration received or receivable from hedging and future sales or
forward sales of the output of the mine, converted at the date of
receipt of the consideration to the equivalent in Canadian funds, if
receivable in funds of another country.
“hedging” means the fixing of a price for output of a mine before
delivery by means of a forward sale or a futures contract on a
recognized commodity exchange, or the purchase or sale forward of a
foreign currency related directly to the proceeds of the output of a
mine, but does not include speculative currency hedging except to the
extent that the hedging transaction determines the final price and
proceeds for the output.
The taxpayer’s appeal was dismissed by the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice, but was allowed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Minister of
Finance appealed to the Supreme Court. LeBel J., writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, allowed the appeal. This elegantly written decision not
only clarifies that the modern rule applies generally to the interpretation of
tax statutes (including provincial statutes), but also provides further
guidance on purposive interpretation.
The Court cited Stubart for the general application of the modern rule to
tax statutes.64 It then cited Canada Trustco for the emphasis of textual
interpretation “because of the degree of precision and detail characteristic
of many tax provisions”.65 The Court also recognized that taxpayer’s are
entitled to rely on the clear meaning of taxation provisions in structuring
their affairs. It concluded that:
Where such a provision admits of no ambiguity in its meaning or in
its application to the facts, it must simply be applied.66
64
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Was the meaning of the word “hedging” ambiguous in the context of the
Mining Tax Act? Apparently - the government argued for a broader
meaning to include transactions that do not involve the delivery of Ontario
mine products, whereas the taxpayer argued for a narrower meaning,
requiring the delivery of Ontario mine products.
Following the three-element TCP approach, the Court started with the
textual or ordinary meaning of “hedging” by referring to the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Canadian jurisprudence.
Under GAAP, a transaction is a “hedge” where a party has assets or
liabilities exposed to a particular financial risk and that risk is mitigated by
the transaction. For example, to mitigate the risk of fluctuating prices, a
party may agree to sell a good in the future at a fixed price (a party
looking to buy a good may enter into that transaction for the same reason).
The court found that there are two basic categories of transactions –
forward contracts and options. A forward contract obligates both parties
to complete the transaction, whereas an option gives one party the right to
complete the transaction. Hedging transactions typically are not settled by
the physical delivery of goods. Instead, they are more commonly settled
by either cash or an offsetting contract. For GAAP purposes, the method
of settlement is irrelevant to the characterization of a transaction as a
“hedge”. Furthermore, as illustrated by Echo Bay Mines Ltd. v. Canada67,
financial transactions not settled by physical delivery of the output of an
Ontario mine may “fix the price” for that output and act as a hedge.
The meaning of “hedging” in the statutory context was established by the
Court by examining the statutory definition of the term, its relationship
with the definition of “proceeds”, and the legislative history of the
statutory definition of “hedging”. The Court stated:
It follows that "the fixing of a price for output of a mine" cannot be
restricted to transactions that are settled by delivery of output. This is,
in my opinion, consistent with the context of the statutory definition.
In addition to "the fixing of a price ... by means of a forward sale",
the definition of "hedging" refers to "the fixing of a price ... by means
67
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of ... a futures contract on a recognized commodity exchange", "the
purchase or sale forward of a foreign currency related directly to the
proceeds of the output of a mine", and "does not include speculative
currency hedging". It is significant that futures contracts are seldom
settled by physical delivery. Similarly, a sale or purchase forward of
foreign currency is a separate transaction from the sale of an
underlying commodity and would not itself be settled by physical
delivery of the commodity. In short, the other elements in the
statutory definition of "hedging" are consistent with the broader
interpretation.68
Therefore, the Court rejected the taxpayer’s narrow interpretation – the
price for the output of an Ontario mine could only be “fixed” by a
transaction that was settled physically.69 If this interpretation was
accepted, the Court reasoned, all consideration from hedging would fall
into the first or third component of the term “proceeds”, leaving the
second component (all consideration from hedging) unnecessary.70
According to the presumption against tautology, “every word in a statute
is presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing
the legislative purpose.”71 Since the definition of hedging was introduced
in the Mining Tax Act for a term that only appears once, the presumption
against tautology carried considerable weight.72
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B. ADVANCING THE MODERN RULE
The Placer Dome decision advanced the application of the modern rule in
several respects. First, it confirmed that TCP applies to tax statutes in
general.
Second, it provided an example of establishing a purposive meaning by
relying on the integrity of the legislative scheme. It gave effect to the
interpretive presumption that “[e]very word in a statute is presumed to
make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative
purpose.”73 The Court stated:
To the extent that it is possible to do so, courts should avoid adopting
interpretations that render any portion of a statute meaningless or
redundant: Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane) Ld., [1949] A.C. 530
(H.L.), at p. 546, per Viscount Simon.74
Third, the Court adopted another important presumption in finding
legislative intent – the presumption against absurdity. It stated:
The Mining Tax Act defines "hedging" as the fixing of a price for the
output of a mine before delivery by means of, inter alia, a forward
sale. Options, as Cullity J. noted, are simply contingent forward sales,
and they fix the price for output in much the same way that forward
contracts do. To attach substantially different tax consequences,
within the context of a provision that taxes "proceeds from hedging"
to two forms of transactions that serve the same function as hedging
tools would be an absurd result that the legislature could not have
intended.75
Finally, the Court relied on evidence in rejecting the taxpayer’s argument
for certainty and predictability, as opposed to simply “imagining” or
“predicting” uncertainty. The Court stated:76
73
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The fact that the taxpayer can and does, presumably on a principled
basis, determine whether hedging profits relate directly to the output
of a mine, for the purpose of claiming the resource allowance under
the Income Tax Act and the Ontario Corporations Tax Act belies
PDC's predictability argument. I note, in this vein, that PDC used the
same financial information that it submitted with its tax return under
the Mining Tax Act to claim that its hedging gains qualified as
"resource profits" so as to entitle it to the resource allowance under
the Corporations Tax Act.

V. IMPERIAL OIL – THE MODERN RULE SPLITS THE
COURT
A. THE DECISION
This case involved two corporate taxpayers – Imperial Oil and Inco. The
issue was whether paragraph 20(1)(f) of the Act permitted the deduction of
foreign exchange losses incurred in the redemption of debt obligations or
whether it is limited to the deduction of original issue discounts.
Imperial Oil had issued debentures denominated in U.S. dollars. Between
the date of issue and the date of redemption of the debentures, the U.S.
dollar had appreciated against the Canadian dollar. The taxpayer suffered
a loss on redemption of C$27.8 million representing the original discount
and the foreign exchange loss. Imperial Oil took the position that it was
entitled to deduct the entire loss under subparagraph 20(1)(f)(i) of the Act.
In the alternative, it took the position that it was entitled to a deduction
under subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii) and that the non-deductible 25 percent
under that formula was by default a capital loss under subsection 39(2).
The Minister took the position that the entire loss of C$27.8 million was
predominantly a capital loss deductible under subsection 39(2).
In 1989, Inco issued sinking fund debentures of US$150 million at a
discount of 2.6 percent (US$ 3.9 million). When Inco retired the
debentures with American currency already on hand, it suffered a loss and
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The Minister disallowed the

Paragraph 20(1)(f) permits the taxpayer to deduct the amount by which the
original issue proceeds of the debt are exceeded by the amount paid in
satisfaction of the principal amount of the debt. It provides that when
computing income from business, a deduction is allowed where:
(f) an amount paid in the year in satisfaction of the
principal amount of any bond, debenture, … issued by the
taxpayer … on which interest was stipulated to be payable,
to the extent that the amount so paid does not exceed,
(i) in any case where the obligation was issued for
an amount not less than 97% of its principal
amount, and the yield from the obligation … does
not exceed 4/3 of the interest stipulated to be
payable on the obligation, … the amount by which
the lesser of the principal amount of the obligation
and all amounts paid in the year or in any preceding
year in satisfaction of its principal amount exceeds
the amount for which the obligation was issued,
and
(ii) in any other case, ¾ of the lesser of the amount so paid
and the amount by which the lesser of the principal amount
of the obligation and all amounts paid in the year or in any
proceeding taxation year in satisfaction of its principal
amount exceeds the amount for which the obligation was
issued.
The issue in this case was whether the deduction under paragraph 20(1)(f)
is limited to a “discount” arising from the original issuance of the debt, or
is it broad enough to include costs related to borrowing in a foreign
currency (such as foreign exchange losses)?
The Minister argued for a narrow interpretation. According to the
Minister, foreign exchange losses are not addressed by paragraph 20(1)(f).
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The exchange rate applicable to the calculation of the principal amount is
an amount in Canadian dollars, fixed on the date of issue. If the exchange
rate is fixed on the issue date, then no discount due to foreign exchange
losses can exist. Since no other specific provision would apply, subsection
39(2) – a residual provision – would apply, treating the foreign exchange
losses as capital losses. The Minister’s position relied on determining
Parliament’s intent, by examining intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.
The taxpayers argued that paragraph 20(1)(f) allows for the deduction of
foreign exchange losses. They argued that when an obligation is issued in
foreign currency, the principal amount is fixed on the date of disposition.
This would allow the fluctuation of the currency to create foreign
exchange gains or losses to expand or reduce the discount deductible
under the paragraph. The taxpayers relied on determining the purpose of
paragraph 20(1)(f) by examining the definition of “principal amount” in
subsection 248(1) and how that expression is used in other provisions of
the Act.
The Supreme Court was split four to three.77 LeBel J. wrote the majority
decision and Binnie J. authored the dissenting judgment.
In the GAAR cases, the goal of the interpretive exercise is to establish the
“object, spirit and purpose” of a statutory provision in order to determine
if that object, spirit and purpose is abused. In non-GAAR cases, such as
this case, the statutory text, context and scheme are used as evidence of
finding legislative intent or purpose. The legislative intent or purpose is
then used to illuminate which textual interpretation is more compatible
with such intent or purpose.

77
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in Imperial Oil.
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B. THE MAJORITY
LeBel J. reiterated the general principles governing the interpretation of
the Act.78 He emphasized that “[w]hether foreign exchange losses are
covered by s. 20(1)(f) must be ascertained with respect to the text, scheme
and context of that provision.”79
Looking at the text of paragraph 20(1)(f), LeBel J. noted that the word
“discount” was absent and there was no express mention of foreign
currency exchanges. However, the opening words of subparagraph
20(1)(f)(i) set out what is commonly accepted as the definition of a
discount. The text of this provision thus suggested that the “primary
referent of s. 20(1)(f) is something other than foreign exchange losses,
namely, payments in the nature of discounts.”80 When the provision was
applied to Canadian dollar obligations, paragraph 20(1)(f) isolated the
difference between the principal amount of the obligation and the amount
for which it was issued – the discount. When the difference is three
percent or less, the discount is fully deductible under subparagraph
20(1)(f)(i) and when it is greater than three percent, it is deductible at the
capital rate under subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii).81 Therefore, when applied to
Canadian dollar obligations, each branch has a clear application and
applies to all original issue discounts. LeBel J. concluded that the
deduction in paragraph 20(1)(f) “does not encompass the appreciation or
depreciation of the principal amount over time.”82
LeBel J. examined whether in the context of debts issued in foreign
currency, does the wording in paragraph 20(1)(f) permit the deduction of
foreign exchange losses? Subparagraph 20(1)(f)(i) applied “in any case
where the obligation was issued for an amount not less than 97 percent of
its principal amount”, while subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii) applied “in any
78
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other case”. This led to the question does the phrase “in any other case” in
subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii) refer to “any case in which the obligation was
issued for an amount less than 97 percent” or to “any case in which the
cost of repaying the principal amount exceeds the amount for which the
debt was issued”? The taxpayers argued the latter. LeBel J. opined that
the “better reading of the opening words of s. 20(1)(f)(ii) is the one that
preserves a higher degree of parallelism of expression (i.e., 'any case in
which the obligation was issued for an amount less than 97%').”83 In other
words, paragraph 20(1)(f) addressed the deductibility of original issue
discounts.
LeBel J. recognized that the calculation of a “discount” is based on the
“principal amount”. If the principal amount of debt is issued in a foreign
currency that can fluctuate, with the cost of repayment in Canadian
dollars, then the discount amount may encompass discounts arising out of
fluctuations of the currency over time.84 This led to another question: does
the statutory definition of “principal amount” in subsection 248(1)
contemplate the possibility that the principal amount can be the amount
payable in Canadian currency at the time of issue or the time of
redemption. If it is the latter, foreign exchange losses would be included.
To resolve this ambiguity, LeBel J. found it necessary to determine
whether Parliament intended foreign exchange losses to be covered by
paragraph 20(1)(f) in the same way as discounts.85
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In LeBel’s view, “s. 20(1)(f) was never intended to apply to foreign
exchange losses.”86 He gave the following reasons for his conclusion:
First, the scheme of subsection 20(1) indicates that only expenses arising
directly out of the borrower-lender relationship are deductible because
other costs enumerated in s. 20 are intrinsic costs of borrowing, such as
interest payments and premiums. Since a foreign exchange loss “is a cost
of borrowing only where the thing borrowed is foreign currency”, it is not
an intrinsic cost of borrowing, and thus not deductible.
Second, an interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) that allows the deduction
of foreign exchange losses means that this section “would operate quite
differently in relation to obligations denominated in foreign currency than
it does in relation to obligations denominated in Canadian dollars.”87
In the context of foreign currency obligations, the deduction would
reflect the appreciation or depreciation of the principal amount over
time, whereas in the context of Canadian dollar obligations, the
deduction would reflect a point-in-time expense. In the context of
foreign currency obligations, the s. 20(1)(f) deduction would
accordingly be available even where, as in Inco, there was no original
issue discount. [This] approach also has the effect of altering the
distinction between the two branches of s. 20(1)(f). 88
Therefore, Parliament could not have intended such a differential tax
treatment as it would create incentives to structure obligations in a
particular way.
Third, the broader context of the Act, such as subsection 39(2), sheds light
on legislative intent. If paragraph 20(1)(f) is interpreted to allow a
deduction of foreign exchange losses, which have been traditionally
characterized as on account of capital,89 it would create conflicts with the
86
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general scheme of the Act treating capital gains and losses separately.
More specifically, it would fail to “properly appreciate the role of s. 39”,
which was a “statement of Parliament's intent to treat foreign exchange
losses as capital losses.”90
Fourth, the broad statement that “Parliament encourages companies to
raise capital by allowing them to deduct virtually all costs of borrowing
under the provisions of s. 20(1)”91 was not persuasive. Paragraph
18(1)(b), for example, provides that payments on account of capital may
not be deducted from business income unless the deduction thereof is
expressly permitted. Therefore, not all costs of borrowing are deductible
under paragraph 20(1)(f).
Ultimately, LeBel rejected the taxpayer’s argument. He stated:92
[It] turns s. 20(1)(f) into a broad provision allowing for the
deductibility of a wide range of costs attendant upon financing in
foreign currency, in the absence of any mention of such costs in the
text of the ITA, and despite the fact that such costs are usually
regarded as being on capital account.

C. THE DISSENT
Binnie J. agreed with LeBel J. that paragraph 20(1)(f) should be
interpreted textually, contextually and purposively.93 However, he
emphasized more of a textual interpretation by vividly describing the
provisions of the Act as the “rules of engagement” for the “battlefield on
which over 21 million Canadian taxpayers engage with the Minister of
generally follows the characterization of the underlying transaction. This is important
because paragraph 18(1)(b) prohibits the deduction of amounts paid on account of capital
unless it is specifically allowed by another section.
90
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National Revenue.”94 He also indicated his discomfort with relying on
legislative intent and his preference for legislative purpose. In the end, he
agreed with the taxpayers and held that foreign exchange losses are
deductible.
Binnie J.’s textual interpretation began with the recognition of the role of
section 20 being a specific provision to allow the deduction of “various
capital amounts” to override paragraph 18(1)(b). As such, he recognized
that the foreign exchange losses were on account of capital and could only
be deductible against income by virtue of section 20. He found that this
provision “permits a deduction of the amount by which the original issue
proceeds of the debt are exceeded by the amount paid in satisfaction of the
principal amount of the debt.”95
He then noted that the expression "principal amount" was used nine times
in the course of paragraph 20(1)(f), signalling its importance. “Principal
amount” is defined in subsection 248(1) to mean the amount that “is the
maximum amount or maximum total amount, as the case may be, payable
on account of the obligation by the issuer”. In the context of debt issued
in a foreign currency, since Canadian dollars must be used for the
purposes of the Act, the maximum amount payable can only be
determined on the date of redemption, not the date of the issuance of the
debt.96 Thus, the relevant exchange rate is the rate prevailing at the date of
redemption. “It is not until that date that it is possible to determine the
"maximum amount … payable on account of the obligation" as required
by the statutory definition of "principal amount".97
Binnie J. cited a number of instances where the Minister has allowed
deductions under paragraph 20(1)(f) for obligations other than those with
original issue discounts.98 He stated that in those cases, the “principal
amount” could not be calculated until the date of repayment that the actual
94
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cost of satisfying the obligation could be ascertained in Canadian dollars.99
Binnie J. also considered foreign exchange losses as a cost that arises
directly out of the debtor-creditor relationship.100
Textually interpreted, Binnie J. concluded that paragraph 20(1)(f) allows
the deduction of the discounts computed by comparing the total principal
amount fixed on the date of redemption and the original proceeds of
issuance.
The broader statutory context, including subsection 39(2), section 79 and
section 80, was not considered helpful. Subsection 39(2) is a residual
provision and applies only to the extent that a foreign currency loss is not
otherwise deductible in computing income.101 He also noted that sections
79 and 80 specifically state that the calculation is to be based on the value
of the foreign debt in Canadian currency on the issuance date. There is no
such specification in paragraph 20(1)(f). Therefore, “there is little help to
be had from other sections of the Act.”102
On the last part of the interpretative process, Binnie J. disagreed with
LeBel J.’s conclusion that paragraph 20(1)(f) is designed to address a
specific class of financing costs arising out of the issuance of debt
instruments at a discount.

D. BASIS FOR THE SPLIT
The majority and the dissent followed the same principle of statutory
interpretation and the same process of textual, contextual and purposive
interpretation, but reached different interpretations of paragraph 20(1)(f).
They seem to differ on several issues discussed below.
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1. NOT ALL WORDS ARE EQUAL IN THE TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION
The Court put a different emphasis on different elements of the statutory
text.
According to LeBel J., the opening words of subparagraph
20(1)(f)(i) set out what is commonly accepted as the definition of a
discount.103 Also, there is no express mention of a foreign currency
exchange. In interpreting the term “principal amount”, LeBel J. referred to
the statutory definition in subsection 248(1), but found it inconclusive as it
“does not expressly address whether or how foreign currency fluctuations
are to be taken into account in determining the "principal amount" of an
obligation denominated in foreign currency” and there was no indication
that “foreign currency conversions were in Parliament's contemplation
when that section was drafted.”104
On the other hand, Binnie J. emphasized the term “principal amount”,
apparently because it is used nine times in paragraph 20(1)(f). He noted
that the definition of “principal amount” is the maximum amount or
maximum total amount payable on account of the obligation by the issuer.
In the case of a foreign issue obligation that contracts the issuer to pay
foreign currency at a future date, the maximum amount actually payable
on account of the obligation is unknown and unknowable at the time of
issuance and can only be ascertained at the date fixed for redemption.105
Binnie J. did not examine the meaning of other words used in paragraph
20(1)(f).
2. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME
The scheme of the Act is important under the modern rule, which
specifically requires that the meaning of the statutory words be “in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act,
the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament". In Canada Trustco,
the Court seemed to have collapsed the “scheme” element into either
103
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“context” or “purposive” element of the rephrased “textual, contextual and
purposive” approach. The Court emphasized in Canada Trustco that:
The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the
interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to
read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole. 106
The phrase “the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole” expresses
the idea of “legislative scheme”. Therefore, legislative scheme is an
important element of statutory interpretation.
LeBel J. specifically referred to the “scheme” of subsection 20(1) as one
factor in rejecting the taxpayers’ argument. The scheme allows a
deduction for intrinsic cost of borrowing and foreign exchange loss is not
such a cost. In his opinion, “the scheme of s. 20, although not dispositive,
does not assist the respondent.”
LeBel J. also appreciated the fact that the Act has separate schemes for
capital gains and losses and income gains and losses:
Despite its undeniable - and growing - complexity, the current federal
ITA displays some fundamental structural characteristics. One of
these characteristics, which is provided for in s. 3, is the distinction
between income and capital. Capital gains are only partially brought
into income for taxation purposes.107
Because subsection 20(1) is part of the income regime, allowing
deductions against income, only capital amounts that are specified under
subsection 20(1) (such as interest and capital cost allowance) are
deductible. Permitting a deduction for foreign exchange losses, which are
on capital account, in the absence of expressed authorization under
subsection 20(1), lead to “conflicts with the general treatment of capital
gains and losses in the ITA.” LeBel J. correctly stated that the taxpayer’s
argument (which was accepted by Binnie J.) “indicates a failure to
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properly appreciate the role of s. 39”, which is a statement of Parliament's
intent to treat foreign exchange losses as capital losses.”108
Binnie J. did not mention the legislative scheme at all. To him, section 39
was of little relevance.109 His failure to properly appreciate the separate
regime for income and capital is clearly demonstrated by his following
remarks: 110
It all comes back to the simple proposition that in Canadian tax terms
foreign currency is a commodity, and its fluctuations will inevitably
carry costs (or benefits). Had the Canadian dollar appreciated against
the U.S. dollar in the relevant period of time, for instance, the
taxpayers would have lost the original issue discount to which they
might otherwise have been entitled. What the taxing authority loses
on the swings it will make up on the roundabouts. At the end of the
day it will have its just desserts.
Binnie J.’s statement is incorrect. Foreign exchange gains and losses are
generally on capital account to Imperial Oil, Inco, and other taxpayers
who are not currency traders. As such, capital expenditures are not
deductible in the absence of a specific provision under section 20. Even if
paragraph 20(1)(f) was interpreted to allow a deduction for foreign
exchange losses, there is no equivalent provision to tax foreign exchange
gains as income. Therefore, foreign exchange gains are not the “just
desserts” to offset the deduction for foreign exchange losses. While
taxpayers will argue for a full deduction for the loss under paragraph
20(1)(f), they will surely not argue for full inclusion of the gain. Instead,
foreign exchange gains will be treated on capital account, partially
taxable.111 The differential treatment of full deduction for the loss and
partial inclusion for the gain can be appreciated only when one appreciates
the scheme of the Act.
108
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3. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OR PURPOSE
In previous cases, the Court was not clear in referring to “purpose” or
“intent” and tended to use them interchangeably. In Imperial Oil, LeBel J.
seemed to emphasize legislative intent, whereas Binnie J. favored
legislative purpose.
LeBel J. concluded that the text, context and scheme of the Act indicate
that Parliament did not intend to allow a deduction for foreign exchange
losses when enacting s.20(1)(f). 112 He noted that the taxpayers argued
that the purpose of paragraph 20(1)(f) was to encourage Canadian
companies to raise capital on the global market, but did not rely on it to
displace the legislative intent. In Binnie J.’s view, such legislative intent
was unexpressed in specific words of the Act and should not be used to
override clear textual meaning. Moreover, Binnie J. found that LeBel J.’s
interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) would defeat the legislative purpose.
Only a broader interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) would be consistent
with such purpose.
While LeBel J. found legislative intent on the basis of the text and scheme
of the Act, it is unclear as to the basis used by Binnie J. in establishing the
legislative purpose. He referred to the legislative history of some of the
deductions113 under subsection 20(1), but not paragraph 20(1)(f) per se.114
The path for finding legislative purpose is not clear.
The overall logic for Binnie J.’s reliance on “legislative purpose” as
opposed to legislative intent is problematic. Binnie J. offered two reasons
for rejecting legislative intent. First, Parliament’s intent “is nowhere
112
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expressed in the Act, although it would have been a simple thing to say so
if that was Parliament's intent.” He provided no examples where
Parliament’s intent is expressed in the Act. Second, “finding unexpressed
legislative intentions under the guise of purposive interpretation runs the
risk of upsetting the balance Parliament has attempted to strike in the
Act.”115
While troubled by relying on unexpressed legislative intent, Binnie J. was
not worried at all about the unexpressed legislative purpose. Instead, he
agreed with LeBel J.’s observation that "Parliament encourages companies
to raise capital by allowing them to deduct virtually all costs of borrowing
under the provisions of s. 20(1)". Naturally, allowing the deduction of
foreign exchange losses advance such purpose. Denying the deduction
would act as a deterrent. Furthermore, given the modest size of the
Canadian capital market,116 “it would be counterproductive in a global
economy to discourage foreign borrowings.”117 Binnie J. did not apply his
criticism of legislative intent to his own approach: how would such
purposive interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) preserve “the balance
Parliament has attempted to strike in the Act”? What is the “balance” in
the first place?
The way that Binnie J. pit “legislative intent” against “legislative purpose”
is unfortunate. Many provisions in the Act originate from the 1917 Act or
subsequent amendments. Given the change in the complexity of business
today and the sophistication of tax advisors, it is likely that these
provisions are used in ways that Parliament never intended.118 Perhaps out
of this concern, LeBel J. did not see legislative intent and purpose to be
mutually exclusive. In the same paragraph of his decision, he used both
terms:
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This interpretation best reflects the structure of the ITA and the intent
of Parliament. The purpose of the provision is to address a specific
class of financing costs arising out of the issuance of debt instruments
at a discount. 119

VI. THE BABY STEPS
The four decisions reviewed in this article indicate that the Court is
prepared to slowly move away from the plain meaning approach towards a
“textual, contextual and purposive” approach or the modern rule. In our
view, the move is in the right direction, but the steps taken are merely
“baby steps”. The Court has yet to provide adequate details on the
implementation of the new approach.
On the general principle of statutory interpretation, the Court has revived
the modern rule on a timid, hesitant and unsteady footing. In each of the
four cases, the Court emphasized the importance of textual interpretation
following the citation of the modern rule. It could be viewed as continuing
the plain meaning approach.120 The Court also qualified the modern rule
with the principle of certainty, predictability and fairness and the respect
for the right of taxpayers’ to legitimate tax minimization. Nonetheless, the
Court has taken the first step in moving beyond pure textual interpretation.
In none of the four cases did the Court refuse to examine the context and
purpose of the statutory provisions. In Placer Dome and Imperial Oil,
LeBel J. did not accept the argument that the long-standing administrative
position be adopted, even if such position was used and relied upon by
taxpayers. Even Binnie J. did not reject an examination of legislative
purpose in Imperial Oil, even though he limited the utility of such
examination to reveal latent ambiguity in the statutory text. 121
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The relative weight of text, context, and purpose in the interpretation
analysis depends on the case. Generally speaking, however, as mentioned
above, more weight is given to the text when the provision is written
specifically. This provides little guidance because determining when a
provision in a taxing statute is written specifically is a subjective
assessment. Moreover, as illustrated in the Imperial Oil case, different
judges may emphasize different elements of the text.
The most under-developed element of the TCP approach is legislative
purpose. The dominant view seems to be that legislative purpose and
intent can be referred to interchangeably. However, in Imperial Oil, a
strong dissent pit “purpose” against “intent” and rejected the latter for very
persuasive reasons. The basis and process for establishing legislative
intent or purpose have yet to be coherently and comprehensively
articulated. Clearly, little guidance can be found in the following
statements:
The purpose of CCA provisions emerges clearly.122
The purpose for the broad treatment of loss sharing between partners
is to promote an organizational structure that allows partners to carry
on a business in common, in a non-arm's length relationship”123
Parliament encourages companies to raise capital by allowing them to
deduct virtually all costs of borrowing under the provisions of s.
20(1).124
It is difficult to imagine that a litigant in a tax case can argue the purpose
or intent of a statutory provision without referring to any extrinsic
materials or scheme of the Act. LeBel J.’s approach to purposive analysis
in Placer Dome and Imperial Oil is thus far the most sophisticated. He
referred to the text, legislative scheme and structure, interpretive
presumptions, and some extrinsic materials.
122
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VII. MOVING FORWARD
A. GREEN-LIGHT ON
Applying the modern rule to the interpretation of a complex statute such as
the Act is inherently difficult.125 The provisions of taxing statutes are
difficult to interpret because of they are technical, detailed and drafted in a
specific manner. The meaning and purpose of a specific provision may be
well-hidden in the quagmire of rules. The Court has traditionally wanted
as little a role as possible in the making of tax law.126 They may not want
to stray into what appears to be creation of new rules that Parliament
might have introduced had it thought about it but which, in fact, it did
not.127 This conservative attitude has kept the courts from becoming a cooperative law-making partner of Parliament in the tax law sphere.128
There are reasons to be optimistic about the Court’s moving forward with
applying the modern rule in the interpretation of the Act. First, within a
two-year time period, the Court first adopted the modern rule in Canada
Trustco and Mathew in the GAAR context, then expanded it in Placer
Dome and Imperial Oil to tax statutes in general. The momentum has been
extremely impressive. The level of sophistication in applying the modern
rule, although far from satisfactory, has improved greatly from Canada
Trustco
to
Imperial
Oil.
Second, it would be difficult to revert back to plain meaning approach
because of the GAAR. As the Court correctly recognized, the GAAR
125
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demands a purposive interpretation. Since the GAAR is potentially
applicable to many provisions of the Act, it would be very odd to switch
the interpretative approach depending on whether GAAR is invoked. It is
time that the Court treats tax statutes like other statutes and apply the
modern rule. In a sense, the GAAR has the effect of being a general rule of
statutory interpretation.129 It would be difficult for judges to fall back on
the strict interpretation or plain meaning with GAAR in the Act. With the
departure of Iaccobucci J., the main author of the decisions advocating the
plain meaning approach,130 Binnie J. may champion the more textual
interpretive approach, but he is surely mindful of the need to look at the
legislative purpose. Also, it will be interesting to see which approach
Rothstein J., who authored some important tax decisions while on the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal131,
will
support.
Third, the Court sent a strong signal about the revival of the modern rule.
The decisions in Canada Trustco, Mathew and Placer Dome are
unanimous, and the Chief Justice co-authored the first two decisions, and
concurred with LeBel J. in Placer Dome and Imperial Oil. However, the
four to three split in Imperial Oil is worrisome because the rationale used
by Binnie J. would represent a step back from purposive interpretation.132
Finally, LeBel J.’s decisions in Placer Dome and Imperial Oil serve as
good precedents. His reference to the statutory text, scheme and structure,
as well as interpretative aids in interpretation is refreshing and
illuminating.

129

This then calls into question the continuing need for the GAAR. See supra note 56.

130

See Duff (2007), supra note 14.

131

See e.g. OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. R, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 82, 2001 D.T.C. 5471 (F.C.A.);
722540 Ontario Inc. [Novopharm Limited] v. R, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 1, 2003 D.T.C. 5195
(F.C.A.); Canadian Pacific Limited v. R, [2002] 2 C.T.C. 197, 2002 D.T.C. 6742
(F.C.A.).
132

The fact that Binnie J. was supported by two members of the Court would suggest that
a return to the plain meaning approach, or some other label to a strict approach, is
possible. However, Binnie J’s position may be affected by the particular facts of the case,
including the fact that the Minister’s administrative practice seemed to support the
taxpayer’s argument.

44

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 06

B. SUGGESTED MOVES
In order to move beyond baby steps in interpreting the Act according to
the modern rule, the courts should assume that the meaning of the
statutory words is ambiguous and engage in contextual and purposive
analysis. It would be unfortunate if the courts continue to find “clear and
plain” meaning when equally talented and devoted lawyers representing
the taxpayer and the government disagree on the meaning of the same
words.
Moreover, the courts should not view the Act just as the rules of
engagement for the “battlefield” between taxpayers and the government.
The Act is a huge government spending statute and a tool of redistribution
and social justice. As early as 1984, Estey J. recognized the changing role
of the Act and used it as an impetus for the initial adoption of the modern
rule. Surely, today’s Court can see the multiple roles of the Act more
clearly and further implement the modern rule.
The Court should assume a more active role in tax law-making through
interpretation. It should seriously consider the presumptions, including
presumption against tautology, presumption against absurd results, and
against self-defeating or internal inconsistency, as important canons of
statutory interpretation. Of course, lawyers need to help the court with
evidence of statutory scheme and extrinsic materials.

